Conceptualizing unilateralism, fragmentationism and statism in a populism context – a rise of populist International Law?
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Peter Bloom, “We Live in a Populist Age – But Who Are “the People”?”, The Conversation, August 9, 2018, available at https://theconversation.com/we-live-in-a-populist-age-but-who-are-the-people-91793
Colantone, Italo and Piero Stanig, The Trade Origins of Economic Nationalism: Import Competition and Voting Behavior in Western Europe", (2018) 62(4) American Journal of Political Science 936-952.
Mark Beeson, Environmental Populism: The Politics of Survival in the Anthropocene (Palgrave MacMillan 2019).
Philip Alston, “The Populist Challenge to Human Rights” (2017) 9(1) Journal of Human Rights Practice 1-15.
Alexander Rossell Hayes & Carolyn Marie Dudek, “How Radical Right-Wing Populism Has Shaped Recent Migration Policy in Austria and Germany”, (2020) 18(2) Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies 133-150.
Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism (Cambridge University Press 2019).
Takis S. Pappas, “Exchange: How to Tell Nativists from Populists”, (2018) 29(1) Journal of Democracy 148-52.
Nicholas Lemann, “The Fate of Populism in 2018”, The New Yorker, November 3, 2017, available at https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-fate-of-populism-in-2018
Kevin P. Clements, “Authoritarian Populism and Atavistic Nationalism: 21st-Century Challenges to Peacebuilding and Development”, (2018) 13(3) Journal of Peacebuilding & Development 1-6.
Robert Keohane calls international institutions and organizations are “regimes”, facilitating cooperation among states. Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony (Princeton University Press 1984).
Atif Mian, Amir Sufi and Francesco Trebbi, “Resolving Debt Overhang: Political Constraints in the Aftermath of Financial Crises”, (2014) 6(2) American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 1-28.
Christian Dippel, Robert Gold and Stephan Heblich “Globalization and its (dis-)content: Trade shocks and voting behavior”, (2015) NBER Working Paper 21812, available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w21812
Lubos Pastor and Pietro Veronesi, “Inequality Aversion, Populism, and the Backlash Against Globalization”, (2019) NBER Working Paper 24900, available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w24900; Paul Hufe, Ravi Kabur and Andreas Peichl “Measuring Unfair Inequality: Reconciling Equality of Opportunity and Freedom from Poverty”, (2018) CEPR Discussion Paper 12989.
Michael Hameleers, “Framing Blame: Toward a Better Understanding of the Effects of Populist Communication on Populist Party Preferences”, (2018) 28(3) Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties 380-398.
Marco Lisi, “Populism, Blame Shifting and the Crisis: Discourse Strategies in Portuguese Political Parties”, (2018) 23(4) south European Society and Politics 405-427.
Kenneth Roth, “The Dangerous Rise of Populism – Global Attacks on Human Rights Values”, Human Rights Watch Global Report 2017, available at https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country-chapters/dangerous-rise-of-populism
Philip Bump, “Where the US Has Considered Leaving or Left International Agreements under Trump”, The Washington Post, June 30, 2018, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2018/06/29/where-the-u-s-has-considered-leaving-or-left-international-agreements-under-trump/
Pranab Bardhan, “Populism In Less Developed Countries Is Somewhat Different”, 3 Quarks Daily, August 6, 2018, available at https://www.3quarksdaily.com/3quarksdaily/2018/08/populism-in-less-developed-countries-is-somewhat-different.html
Harold Hongju Koh, The Trump Administration and International Law, 56 Washburn Law Journal 413 (2017), 420.
Id.
Catherine M. Brolmann, Richard Collins, Sufyan El Droubi, Ramses A Wessel, “Exiting International Organizations: A Brief Introduction”, (2018) 15(2) International Organizations Law Review 243-263.
Due to President Trump’s displeasure with the Korea-US Free Trade Agreement (often referred to as KORUS), the US and South Korea renegotiated the agreement, which became Trump’s first trade deal. KORUS 2.0 is a tweak of the original KORUS but contains some major changes demanded by the US including steel export restrictions, a larger quota for U.S. cars exported to Korea that meet U.S. emissions and safety standards instead of Korea’s idiosyncratic rules, an extension of the duration of the U.S. 25% tariffs on imported pickup trucks, changes to rules on Korean medicine pricing, and new procedures for Korean customs inspections. Simon Lester, Inu Manak and Kyounghwa Kim, “Trump’s First Trade Deal: The Slightly Revised Korea-US Free Trade Agreement”, CATO Institute, June 13, 2019, available at https://www.cato.org/publications/free-trade-bulletin/trumps-first-trade-deal-slightly-revised-korea-us-free-trade
Roberta Rampton, “US Withdraws from International Accords, Says UN World Court ‘Politicized’”, Reuters, October 4, 2018, available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-diplomacy-treaty/us-reviewing-agreements-that-expose-it-to-world-court-bolton-idUSKCN1MD2CP
Ibid.
Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017).
Section 301 of the United States Trade Act of 1974 authorize the U.S. president to take unilateral action against countries that failed to protect U.S. intellectual property. See Alan O. Sykes, Constructive Unilateral Threats in International Commercial Relations: The Limited Case for Section 301 (1992).
See Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, “Special 301”: Its Requirements, Implementation, and Significance, 13 Fordham International Law Journal, 259 (1990).
Id.
These non-US affiliates are located in 26 countries.
The restrictions were posted by the Department of Commerce on the Federal Register Notice on May 16, 2019. All items in the United States are subject to the jurisdiction of the Department of Commerce and EAR, a list of organizations as identified by BIS as engaging activities that could be contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States are included in the BIS list, and United States enterprises are banned from exporting to organizations on the Entity List.
BIS cited the 13 court indictment against Huawei accusing Huawei of willfully conducting and concealing millions of dollars’ worth of transactions in violation of US economic transactions against Iran. The indictment accuses certain non-US Huawei affiliates of having participated in the alleged criminal conduct.
The restrictions affect US subsidiaries of foreign companies which are US persons and US companies’ business with any foreign companies that have contracts with Huawei involving information or communications technology or services. The US-origin items can be located in the US or other places in the world, or exported from the US, or any foreign-made item with more than 25% US-origin content or 10% US-origin content for countries subject to US sanctions, or any foreign-made item that is the direct product of certain controlled US-origin software, technology, or major plant or equipment located abroad.
“America v. China Huawei and 5Geopolitics”, The Economist, April 11-17, 2020, at 10.
Stu Woo and Kate O’Keeffe, “Washington Asks Allies to Drop Huawei”, The Wall Street Journal, November 23, 2018, available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/washington-asks-allies-to-drop-huawei-1542965105 (last accessed March 31, 2020).
See Jimmy Gurule, The Demise of the U.N. Economic Sanctions: Regime to Deprive Terrorists of Funding, 41 Case W. Res. J. Int’L 19, 20-28 (2009).
Harry L. Clark, Dealing with U.S. Extraterritorial Sanctions with Foreign Countermeasures, 20 U. PA. J. International Economics and Law 61, 63-64 (1999) (discussing U.S. efforts to induce foreign corporation to abide by U.S. sanctions against third countries, such as Cuba or Iran).
Stuart S. Malawer, “Pending Section 232 Litigation and Broader Trade Trends: Will the US Courts Restrict Presidential Authority from Relying upon National Security?”, 1 China & WTO Review 183 (2019), 185.
Antonios Tzanakopoulos, The Right to be Free from Economic Coercion, 4 Cambridge International Law Journal 616, 617 (2015).
Sarah Cleveland, Norm Internalization and Economic Sanctions, 55.
Phillippe Sands, Unilateralism, Values and International Law, 11 EJIL 291, 293 (2000).
Williams J. Aceves, The Economic Analysis of International Law: Transaction Cost Economics and the Concept of State Practice, (1996) 17(4) University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law 996-1068; Joel P. Trachtman, Trade and … Problems, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Subsidiarity, (1998) 9 European Journal of International Law 32-85 (arguing the cost-benefit analysis is not applied, and the utility of trade-off devices instead).
David Cohen & Zachary Goldman, Like it or Not, Unilateral Sanctions are Here to Stay, ASIL Unbound (2019).
Id.
M. Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment (2nd edn. Cambridge University Press 2004) p.233.
Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, Ad Hoc Committee Decision on Application for Annulment, 2002, ICSID Report, Vol. 6, 2004, p.933.
ADC Affiliate Limited and ADC & ADMC Management Limited v. The Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No.ARB/03/16, Award, para.288-293 (2006).
See Antoine Goetz and others v. Republic of Burundi, ICSID Case No. ARB/95/3, Award, para. 98 (1999).
See Chen Hongrui, The Application of Host State’s Law in International Investment Arbitration: The Acceptability of Article 30 of US Model BIT, in Journal of International Economic Law (Chen An ed., University Press, 2010), pp. 162-167. (Chen Hongrui: Lun Dong Dao Guo Fa Lv Zai Guo Ji Tou Zi Zhong Cai Zhong De Shi Yong——Jian Ping 2004 Nian Mei Guo BIT Fan Ben Di 30 Tiao De Ke Jie Shou Xing, Chen An Zhu Bian: Guo Ji Jing Ji Fa Xue Kan 17(4）, Beijing: Bei Jing Da Xue Chu Ban She, 2010, 162-167.)
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, adopted and opened for signature on 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980 (1155 United Nations Treaty Series 331) was acceded to by Kazakhstan on 5 January 1994 and by Uzbekistan on 12 July 1995.
Pavel Borissov, Aibar Burkitbayev, Almas Chukin and others v. Republic of Uzbekistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/6, Decision on Jurisdiction, para. 413, 541(2017).
See Pavel Borissov, Aibar Burkitbayev, Almas Chukin and others v. Republic of Uzbekistan, ICSID Case No.ARB/13/6, Partial Dissenting Opinion Professor Philippe Sands QC, para.10 (2017).
See Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partuergoa v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Award, para. 1199 (2016).
See Bear Creek Mining Corporation v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21, Award, paras.267-269 (2017).
See Gabriel Egli, Don’t Get Bit: Addressing ICSID’s Inconsistent Application of Most-Favored-Nation Clauses to Dispute Resolution Provisions, 34 Pepperdine Law Review 1045, 1084 (2007).
Sébastien Manciaux, The Notion of Investment: New Controversies, 9 Journal World Investment and Trade 443, 444 (2008).
Clara Picasso Achaval, Tipping the Balance Towards Investors, 9 Journal World Investment and Trade 147, 162 (2008).
Susan Karamanian, International Decision, Compania de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. & Vivendi Universal S.A. v Argentine Republic, 105 American Journal of International Law 553, 555 (2011).
See Charity L. Goodman, Uncharted Waters: Financial Crisis and Enforcement of ICSID Awards in Argentina, 28 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law 449, 483 (2007).
Silvia Karina Fiezzoni1, The Challenge of UNASUR Member Countries to Replace ICSID Arbitration, 2 Beijing Law Review 134, 135-136 (2011).
Gobierno Bolivariano denuncia convenio con Ciadi, 25 January 2012, available at http://www.cadtm.org/Gobierno-Bolivariano-denuncia (last visited Feb. 12, 2019).
Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (6th edn, Oxford, Clarendon Press 2003), p.513; E. Paasivirta, Participation of States in International Contracts and Arbitral Settlement of Disputes (Finnish Lawyers’ Publishing Company, Helsinki 1990) p.265.
This number includes 16 ICSID arbitrations proper and 4 arbitrations under the ICSID Additional Facility Rules. See http://icsid.worldbank.org. According to UNCTAD’s information, there are no (publicly known) IIA-based claims pending against Venezuela in other international fora.
Theoretically, disgruntled foreign investors will be able to initiate new cases during the six months between the notice of denunciation and the date when it becomes effective on July 25, 2012.
See UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2011, p. 94 et seq.
H. El-Kady, Egypt’s Bilateral Investment Treaties: A Straitjacket in a New Era of Foreign Investment Re-regulations?, Dec. 12, 2011, available at https://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/Article asp?key=1826#citation (last visited Jan. 29, 2019).
In the first 100 cases of ICSID, Latin American countries were concerned by 25 cases (8 cases for Argentina, 7 for Mexico, 3 in Venezuela and other countries with one). But in recent years, “ICSID has witnessed a dramatic increase in the number of arbitrations where Latin American countries are respondents”. Katia Fach Gomez, Latin America and ICSID: David versus Goliath, Law and Business Review of the Americas 195, 195 (2011). For a total of 262 cases (indicated at ICSID website), Latin American countries are concerned by 81 cases (let say 30,9% of concluded cases): Argentina 25 cases, Mexico 13, Ecuador 10, Venezuela 11, Peru 6, Costa Rica 5, Bolivia, Chile and Honduras with 2 cases each, and El Salvador, Guatemala, Panama and Paraguay with one case each. There are 167 pending cases as of May 30, 2013, and the number of cases concerning Latin American Sates is 73, (let say 43.7% of the total number of pending cases): Argentina with 25 cases, Venezuela with 25, Peru 6, Ecuador and Guatemala with 3 each, Bolivia, Costa Rica and El Salvador and Paraguay with 2, Chile, Honduras, and Uruguay with one each.
Nicolas Beoglin, ICSID and Latin America: Criticisms, Withdrawals and Regional Alternatives, Comm for the Abolition of Third World Debt, July 4, 2013.
Bill of Argentina Congress dates April 21, 2012. Text of the draft of that bill available at http://www1.hcdn.gov.ar/proyxml/expediente.asp?fundamentos=si&numexp=1311-D-2012 (last visited Feb. 29, 2019).
Come and Get Me, Economist, Feb. 18, 2012.
In 2008, Ecuador terminated nine BITs – with Cuba, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Romania and Uruguay.
Wenhua Shan, Is Calvo Dead?, 55 American Journal of Comparative Law 123, 163 (2007).
See Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, Towards a Greater Depoliticization of Investment Disputes: The Roles of ICSID and MIGA, 1 ICSID Review-Foreign Investment Law Journal 1, 24-25 (1986).
ICSID, Annual Report (1984) 5.
By the end of January 2019, India, Brazil and South Africa had not joined ICSID. See ICSID, available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/Member-States.aspx (last visited Jan. 31, 2019).
According to World Investment Report 2018, India and Brazil have long been at the forefront of capital outflows and inflows in the world, and South Africa, as a regional investment power, has always been affecting Africa’s investment outflows and inflows. See UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2018, pp.4-6, Jun.6, 2018, available at https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2018_en.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2018).
Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, Towards a Greater Depoliticization of Investment Disputes: The Roles of ICSID and MIGA, 1 ICSID Review-Foreign Investment Law Journal 1, 3 (1986).
Model Text for the Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty, Articles 15.1, 15.2, 15.4, 15.5.
Id. at Article 13.5.
Id. at Article 16.1.
Feorges R Delaume, ICSID and the Banker, 2 International Financial Law Review 9, 13 (1983).
Sonia E. Rolland, The Return of State Remedies in Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Trends in Developing Countries, 49 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal 387, 395-399 (2017).
See Rohit Bhat, Will India Do Away with Investor State Arbitration?, Aug. 23, 2017, available at http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2017/08/23/will-india-away-investor-state-arbitration/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2019).
See Jonathan Lang & Bowman Gilfillan, “Bilateral Investment Treaties - A Shield or A Sword?”, pp. 2-3, Nov. 8, 2013, available at http://www.bowmanslaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/PPI-article_mailshot_08112013_1038389_1-1.pdf, (last visited Jan. 9, 2019).
Protection of Investment Act (Act No. 22/2015) (S. Aft.).
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Republic Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. ICSID, History of the ICSID Convention. Documents Concerning the Origin and the Formulation of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, Washington DC, ICSID, Vol. II-1, pp. 606-608. See also English studies using “No-de-Tokyo” Spanish expression: for instance, Ignacio A. Vincentelli, The Uncertain Future of ICSID in Latin America, Dec. 19, 2009, available at http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=ignacio_vincentelli (last visited Jan. 5, 2019).
Katia Fach Gomez, Latin American Approach to International Dispute Resolution, American Society of International Law Meeting in Washington, Mar. 25, 2011, available at http://www.academia, edu/830249/latin_American_Approaches-to_International_Dispute_Resolution (last visited Jan. 9, 2019).
Ibid.
E.g., Shirley V. Scott, International Law in World Politics: An Introduction (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers 2010) 19-27; Antony Anghie, “Rethinking Sovereignty in International Law,” (2009) 5 Annual Review of Law and Social Science 291.
Eric A. Posner, The Perils of Global Legalism (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press 2009) Ch. 8.
Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (5th edn. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1998) 66-67.
Ibid.
In other international law arenas, the emergence of new actors such as private military and security companies has created new challenges for international humanitarian law. Daniel Thürer, International Humanitarian Law: Theory, Practice, Context (Hague: Hague Academy of International Law 2011) 252.
Rosalyn Higgns, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1994) 39.
E.g., in a number of cases American investors filed against Argentina on claims arisen from breaches of US-Argentina BIT including CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentina Republic (Merits) (12 May 2005), 44 ILM 1205, state responsibility under international law to ensure a stable and predictable environment for foreign investors in the midst of financial downturn was repeatedly raised as an issue.
Ian Bremmer, “The Return of State Capitalism”, (2008) 50 (3) Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 55.
Tom McNamara, “Foreign Sovereign Immunity during the New Nationalisation Wave”, (2010) 11(1) Business Law International 5-38.
“The Rise of State Capitalism”, The Economist, 21 January 2012, available at http://www.economist.com/node/21543160.
E.g., “SOEs as Driving Force”, in Lutz-Christian Wolff (ed.), China Outbound Investments: A Guide to Law and Practice (Hong Kong: CCH Hong Kong Limited 2011) 4.
For a description of different resources of SWF assets, see Bryan J. Balin, “Sovereign Wealth Funds: A Critical Analysis”, (2009) Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1477725.
International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds (IWG) “Sovereign Wealth Funds Generally Accepted Principles and Practices ‘Santiago Principles’”(2008); David Gaukrodger,“Foreign State Immunity and Foreign Government Controlled Investors”, (2010) OECD Working Papers on International Investment available at https://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/WP-2010_2.pdf.
Olivia S. Mitchell, John Piggott and Cagri Kumru, “Managing Public Investment Funds: Best Practices and New Challenges”, (2008) National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 14078 available at https://www.business.unsw.edu.au/research-site/australianinstituteforpopulationageingresearch-site/Documents.
Ibid.
Stephen Jen, “Sovereign Wealth Funds: What They Are and What’s Happening”, (2007) 8 World Economics 1, 1-2.
Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, “Fund Rankings” (2014) available at http://www.swfinstitute.org/fund-rankings.
CNOOC is not a SWF by definition, but according to the controlling interests of 70% it could be approximated as an SWF in order to simplify the analysis. See generally Theodore H. Cohn, Global Political Economy (6th edn. Longman 2012) Ch. 9.
Clare O’Brien, Tania Mattei and Naveen Thomas, “Sovereign Wealth Funds: Evolving Perceptions and Strategies, Securities & Regulation Law Report”, (2012) 44 (50) Bloomberg BNA Securities and Law Report 1.
UNCTAD World Investment Report 2011, available at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2011_en.pdf.
“Norway Wealth Fund Grows to Record 10 Trillion Crowns”, Reuters, October 25, 2019, available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-norway-swf-record/norway-wealth-fund-grows-to-record-10-trillion-crowns-idUSKBN1X41AO
Otaviano Canuto & Marcelo Giugale (eds) The Day After Tomorrow: A Handbook on the Future of Economic Policy in the Developing World (Washington DC: The World Bank 2010).
Preqin Global Private Equity & Venture Capital Report - Sample Pages, available at https://www.preqin.com/docs/reports/2015-Preqin-Global-Private-Equity-and-Venture-Capital-Report-Sample-Pages.pdf.
Bart De Meester, “International Legal Aspects of Sovereign Wealth Funds: Reconciling International Economic Law and the Law of State Immunities with a New Role of the State”, (2009) Institute for International Law Working Paper No. 20, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1308542.
For a general description of China’s “Go Globally” strategy, which consists of a serious of national policy incentives that are used by the Chinese government to encourage its companies to invest abroad, see Ilan Alon, Hua Wang, Jun Shen, Wenxian Zhang, "Chinese State-Owned Enterprises Go Global", (2014) 35 Journal of Business Strategy 3, 3 – 18.
Angel Gurria, “China Go Global”, OECD, March 24, 2014, available at https://www.oecd.org/china/china-go-global.htm.
E&Y, “Overview of China Outbound Investment in 2019”, February 13, 2020, available at https://www.ey.com/cn/en/newsroom/news-releases/news-2020-ey-overview-of-china-outbound-investment-in-2019
SWFI, “Top 89 Largest Sovereign Wealth Fund Rankings by Total Assets”, available at https://www.swfinstitute.org/fund-rankings/sovereign-wealth-fund
For a summary of the purpose of CIC a reference to their website is provided, “About CIC”, available at http://www.china-inv.cn/wps/portal/.
Ewa Cieślik, “Investment Strategy of Sovereign Funds from Emerging Markets: The Case of China”, (2014) 24 Bulletin of Geography. Socio-Economic Series 27, 28.
Iacob N. Koch-Weser and Owen Haacke, China Investment Corporation: Recent Developments in Performance, Strategy, and Governance Paperback (CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform 2014).
Ibid.
Ibid.
Santiago Perez, “Qatar Holding Buys 20% Stake in BAA for $1.4 Billion”, The Wall Street Journal, 17 August 2012, available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390444375104577595242977156080.
Chris Carr, “’National Interest’ Concerns and Uncertain Investment Regime Are Impeding Important Investments by Sovereign Wealth Funds”, (2013) 3 Harvard Business Review Online 67, available at http://www.hblr.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Carr_National-Interest-Concerns.pdf.
Law of the People’s Republic of China on Judicial Immunity from Measures and Constraints of the Property of Foreign Central Banks, Law on Judicial Measures Over Assets of National Bank (2005).
Mainland and Hong Kong Close Economic Partnership Act (2003).
UNCTAD World Investment Report 2015, available at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationLibrary/wir2015_en.pdf.
HKTDC, “Economic and Trade Information on China”, 14 March 2016, available at http://china-trade-research.hktdc.com/business-news/article/Fast-Facts/Economic-and-Trade-Information-on-China/ff/en/1/1X000000/1X09PHBA.htm.
Data gathered from Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Judgments in Decided Cases, available at http://www.hkcfa.hk/en/work/cases/judgments/index.html.
Ching Kwan Lee, The Specter of Global China: Politics, Labor, and Foreign Investment in Africa (2018) 32-3.
Yuwa Hedrick-Wong, “China, Populism, and the Demise of the Liberal Global Economic Order”, Forbes November 3, 2019, available at https://www.forbes.com/sites/yuwahedrickwong/2019/11/03/china-populism-and-the-demise-of-the-liberal-global-economic-order/#4ff034a37682
DP World Djibouti FZCO v. Djibouti, London Court of International Arbitration.
“Djibouti Rejects Court Ruling to Hand Back Container Terminal”, The Wall Street Journal (Jan 17, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/djibouti-rejects-court-ruling-to-hand-back-container-terminal-11579296713.
Id.
Jeffry Frieden, “The Backlash Against Globalization and the Future of the International Economic Order”, (2018) The Next Phase of Globalization: Capitalism and Inequality in the Industrialized World.
“Populism: Consequences for Global Sustainable Development”, German Development Institute Briefing Paper 8/2019, available at https://www.die-gdi.de/uploads/media/BP_8.2019.pdf
Samuel Handlin, “The Logic of Polarizing Populism: State Crises and Polarization in South America”, Sage Journals (2018), available at https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0002764218756922
Office of the Regional Chief Economists, “Polarization and Populism – Europe and Central Asia Economic Update”, November 2016, available at http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/494811479976405381/pdf/Polarization-and-populism.pdf
Philipp Müller, Christian Schemer, Martin Wettstein, Anne Schulz, Dominique S. Wirz, Sven Engesser, Werner Wirth, “Populist Attitudes in the Public: Evidence from a Panel Study in Four European Democracies”, (2017) 67(6) Journal of Communication 968-992.
Herbert Grubel, “Is Populism Endangering the Liberal World Order?” (September 10, 2019), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3451416
Hiroki Osada, “The Adamant World Order: Is Populism a Threat to the World Order?”, The Geopolitics, May 19, 2018, available at https://thegeopolitics.com/the-adamant-world-order-is-populism-threat-to-the-world-order/
Michael Lee, “Populism or Embedded Plutocracy? The Emerging World Order”, (2019) 61(2) Survival Global Politics and Strategy 53-82.
Dan Balz, “Instability and Populist Unrest is the New World Order”, The Washington Post, December 12, 2018, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/instability-and-populist-unrest-is-the-new-world-order/2018/12/11/0959c858-fd7b-11e8-862a-b6a6f3ce8199_story.html
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5102/rdi.v17i2.6680
ISSN 2236-997X (impresso) - ISSN 2237-1036 (on-line)
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